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I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has been marked by an increase in lawsuits
against retailers' and manufacturers 2 of defective products. While
1. See, e.g., Pan-Alaska Fisheries v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129
(9th Cir. 1977); Burton v. LO. Smith Foundry Prods. Co., 529 F.2d 108 (7th Cir.
1977); Marko v. Stop & Shop, 169 Conn. 550, 364 A.2d 217 (1975); Thomas v.
Kaiser Agricultural Chem., 81 IM. 2d 206, 407 N.E.2d 32 (1980); Anderson v.
Harry's Army Surplus, Inc., 117 Mich. App. 601, 324 N.W.2d 96 (1982); Frey v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782 (Minn. 1977); Farr v. Armstrong Rub-
ber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Wilfong v. General Motors Corp., 685 F.2d 1049 (8th Cir. 1982); Stan-
dard Alliance, Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978); Fergu-
son v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 524 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Conn. 1981); Moorman Mfg.
Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Beckmire v. Ris-
tokrat Clay Prods. Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d 411, 343 N.E.2d 530 (1976); Osborn v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 893 (Iowa 1980); Voth v. Chrysler Motor
Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371 (1976); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steele
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there are several theories on which to base a products liability ac-
tion,3 not all of them may be available to the plaintiff due to the
nature of the injury or damage sustained,4 the particular party be-
ing sued,5 or the applicable statute of limitations.6
When the plaintiff has suffered personal injury or property
damage due to a defective product, he may bring an action under
the tort theories of strict liability7 or negligence, or for breach of
Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983); Mooris v. Chrysler Corp., 208
Neb. 341, 303 N.W.2d 500 (1981); Jandreau v. Sheesley Plumbing and Heating
Co., 324 N.W.2d 266 (S.D. 1982); Moor v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 320 N.W.2d 927 (S.D.
1982).
3. A plaintiff may bring a products liability suit under the theories of negli-
gence, strict liability, or breach of warranty. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 641-82 (1971). In National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steele Tube
Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983), and Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National
Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982), the respective courts briefly dis-
cuss the scope of each of the aforementioned theories at various points in
their opinions.
4. See Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981) (the
theories of negligence and strict liability are available only where there is
personal injury to the plaintiff or damage to property other than to the prod-
uct itself). See also Jones & Laughlin Steel v. Johns-Manville Sales, 626 F.2d
280 (3d Cir. 1980); Sioux City Community School Dist. v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 662 (D. Iowa 1978); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank
Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steele
Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983).
5. Some states have limited the parties who may be sued under the theory of
strict liability. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,181 (1979) (no product liability ac-
tion based on the doctrine of strict liability shall be commenced or main-
tained against a person other than the manufacturer); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs
ANN. § 20-9-9 (1979) (distributor, wholesaler or retailer cannot be sued under
the doctrine of strict liability, unless also the manufacturer of the product or
knew of the defective condition of the product); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.040 (Supp. 1983-84) (a seller other than the manufacturer is liable only
for negligence, breach of warranty or intentional misrepresentation, with a
few delineated exceptions). Other states have not exempted nonmanufac-
turers from strict tort liability in product liability actions. In such states, the
courts have held that a distributor, wholesaler, or retailer may be sued under
the doctrine of strict liability. See, e.g., Marko v. Stop & Shop, 169 Conn. 550,
364 A.2d 217 (1975); Sipari v. Villa Olivia Country Club, 63 Ill. App. 3d 1985, 380
N.E.2d 819 (1978); Osborn v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 893 (Iowa
1980).
6. A plaintiffs cause of action may accrue at different times, depending upon
the theory on which the plaintiff bases his claim. Likewise, the time period in
which suit must be brought after the action accrues may vary from one the-
ory to the next. As a result, the plaintiff may be barred from bringing a
breach of warranty action, but still be able to bring a suit for negligence or
strict liability. See J. WHrE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAI, CODE § 11-9, at 415-20 (1980).
7. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). It states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
[Vol. 63:611
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warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code.8 But where the
plaintiff has suffered solely an economic loss,9 the remedy lies ex-
clusively under the Uniform Commercial Code for breach of war-
ranty.10 An action against a seller for breach of warranty must be
commenced within the time period prescribed in section 2-725.11
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must commence his action within four years
after the goods were tendered for delivery, whether or not he
knows the goods are defective.12 However, the second sentence of
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the connection in which it is sold.
(2) the rule stated in subsection 1 applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
8. See supra note 3. Nebraska passed the Uniform Commercial Code in its en-
tirety in 1963. 1963 Neb. Laws 49. With respect to the sections pertinent to
this Article, the Nebraska Legislature incorporated the Code in the Nebraska
statutes without altering the language or section numbers. Therefore, as a
matter of convenience, this Article will cite specific Code sections to the Uni-
form Commercial Code rather than to the Nebraska statutes.
9. "Economic loss" has been defined as "damages for inadequate value, costs of
repair and replacement of the defective product ... without any claim of per-
sonal injury or damage to the other property. . . ." Note, Economic Loss in
Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L, REV. 917, 918 (1966). Ordina-
rily, economic loss is "the difference between the actual value of the goods
accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted."
J. WssrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 11-5, at 406 (1980). Generally, eco-
nomic loss is measured "by the purchaser's cost of replacement of cost of
repair." Id.
10. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel v. Johns-Manville Sales, 626 F.2d 280, 284-90
(3d Cir. 1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 M. 2d 69, 85-88, 435
N.E.2d 443, 450-53 (1982); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steele Tube Co., 213
Neb. 782, 787-90, 332 N.W.2d 39, 46-47 (1983). See generally J. WHrE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 6, at §§ 11-2 to -9 (1980).
11. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1978). It provides, inter alia:
(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be com-
menced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By
the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limita-
tion to not less than one year but may not extend it.
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless
of the agreed party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where
a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the
cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been
discovered.
12. Id. The last sentence of subsection (1) allows the parties to the agreement to
reduce the limitation period to less than four years. See, e.g., Standard Alli-
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section 2-725(2) provides that if a warranty "explicitly extends to
future performance" of the product, the plaintiff has four years
from the time the defect is discovered to commence his action.13
This exception to the general rule has posed interpretive difficul-
ties for the courts in determining when a warranty "explicitly ex-
tends to future performance."
In Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc.,14 the Nebraska
Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the plaintiffs' action
for breach of warranty was timely commenced under section 2-725.
In rendering its decision, the court had to deal with the perplexing
language of section 2-725(2) and determine whether the warranty
"explicitly extended to future performance." This Article will ex-
amine Moore in light of the construction previously given to sec-
tion 2-725(2) by other jurisdictions and the Nebraska Supreme
Court. First, it will present the facts and holding in Moore. It will
then closely examine the language of section 2-725 and the inter-
pretation given it by other jurisdictions and the Nebraska
Supreme Court. The Moore decision itself will be examined within
this framework. Finally, this Article will discuss the possible im-
pact of Moore on future product liability suits in Nebraska.
II. THE MOORE DECISION
A. The Facts
Sometime during the construction of their house in 1970 and
1971, Dennis and Lois Moore purchased lauan 5 siding which was
manufactured by the defendant, Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. In Oc-
tober, 1977, the Moores noticed that the siding was beginning to
deteriorate. 6 By 1979, the problem had become so severe that the
Moores began to investigate ways to remedy the situation. Almost
ten years after purchasing the siding,'7 the Moores filed suit in the
ance, Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 818 (6th Cir. 1978); Jandreau v.
Sheesley Plumbing & Heating Co., 324 N.W.2d 266, 270 (S.D. 1982).
13. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1977). Throughout this Article, the principle that the cause
of action accrues when the defect is or should have been discovered, rather
than at tender of delivery, will be referred to as the "discovery exception." It
has also been referred to as the "future performance exception." See Note,
The Code Giveth and the Code Taketh Away: Implied Warranties and the
Statute of Limitations, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 783 (1980).
14. 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983).
15. Lauan consists of various Philippine timbers that are redish brown or brown
in color, moderately close-grained, and of moderate strength and durability.
WEBSTER's THmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1277 (1971).
16. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 16, 332 N.W.2d 212, 214
(1983).
17. Between the time when the Moores first noticed that the siding was deterio-
rating (October, 1977), and the time when they filed suit (April, 1981), they
[Vol. 63:611
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Omaha Municipal Court on April 24, 1981, against the
manufacturer.18
In their complaint,19 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
breached implied warranties of merchantability, 20 and of fitness
for a particular purpose.2 1 Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed an
amended petition, alleging that the defendant had expressly war-
ranted in writing that the siding was merchantable and reasonably
fit for the purpose for which it was to be used.22 In response, de-
made considerable efforts to notify the supplier from whom they had
purchased the siding. The original supplier had gone out of business, and the
Moores were directed by a lumber dealer to another supplier of Puget Sound
Plywood, Inc. However, this second supplier, Rehcon, Inc., had terminated
its relationship with Puget Sound three months before the Moores gave no-
tice to Rehcon, Inc. Unable to locate another representative of Puget Sound
Plywood with whom to work out a solution, the Moores filed suit. In addition
to deciding whether the Moores' suit was timely fied, the Nebraska Supreme
Court also had to decide whether the Moores had satisfied the notification
requirement of U.C.C. § 2-607(3) (a) (1978). Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood,
Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 18-20, 332 N.W.2d 212, 215-16 (1983).
18. Id. at 16, 332 N.W.2d at 214.
19. Transcript at 75 (Plaintiffs' Original Complaint), Moore v. Puget Sound Ply-
wood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983).
20. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978) provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316), a warranty that
the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale
if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under
this section, the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed
either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality
within the description; and
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are
used; and
(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all
units involved. and
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged and labeled as the
agreement may require; and(f) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on
the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (section 2-316), other implied
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
21. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978) provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know
any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the
buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next
section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose.
22. Transcript at 64 (Plaintiffs' Amended Petition), Moore v. Puget Sound Ply-
wood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983).
616 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:611
fendant submitted an affidavit of the treasurer of Puget Sound Ply-
wood, Inc., which stated that Puget Sound had never published
written warranties of any kind in reference to its siding.23 The de-
fendant specifically denied that any express warranties were given
in connection with the siding, and affirmatively pleaded that the
plaintiffs' action for breach of implied warranties was barred by
the U.C.C. statute of limitations, section 2-725.24 The plaintiffs then
abandoned their express warranty claim, and proceeded to trial on
the theory that the defendant breached implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.25 In addition,
the plaintiffs argued that the implied warranty claims were not
barred by the statute of limitations.26
The parties agreed that the trial court could take judicial notice
that siding is ordinarily supposed to "last the life of the house."27
The trial court held that the plaintiffs' action was barred by the
statute of limitations.28 The district court affirmed.29 On appeal to
the Nebraska Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argued that "where a
seller impliedly warrants the future performance of a product, the
statute of limitations is extended until the breach is or should have
been discovered."30 The defendant responded that an implied war-
ranty by its very nature cannot fall within the "discovery" excep-
tion of section 2-725(2).31
B. The Nebraska Supreme Court Holding
The Nebraska Supreme Court found it unnecessary to decide
the case on the basis of a breach of implied warranties.3 2 Instead,
the court found that the defendant had given an express oral war-
ranty under U.C.C. section 2-313 when it represented to the plain-
tiffs that the product was "siding."33 Recognizing that the parties
had stipulated that siding is expected to last the life of a house, the
court held that the description of the goods as "siding" created an
express warranty that explicitly extended to the future perform-
23. Transcript at 49 (Affidavit), Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14,
332 N.W.2d 212 (1983).
24. Transcript at 50 (Defendant's Answer), Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc.,
214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983).
25. Transcript at 9-11 (Plaintiffs' Trial Brief), Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood,
Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983).
26. Id.
27. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 16, 332 N.W.2d 212, 214
(1983).
28. Id. at 15, 332 N.W.2d at 214.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 16, 332 N.W.2d at 214.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 17, 332 N.W.2d at 214-15.
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ance of the siding.34 In light of the expectations of the parties, the
warranty explicitly extended to future performance and the plain-
tiffs' action did not accrue until the breach was discovered.35 Hav-
ing filed suit within four years of discovery, the court concluded
that the plaintiffs' action was timely commenced under section 2-
725.
III ANALYSIS
A. The Code Analysis
Generally, section 2-725 requires that a plaintiff bring an action
for breach of warranty within four years after the cause of action
accrues.36 Therefore, the essence of section 2-725 is determining
when the plaintiffs cause of action accrued. Section 2-725(2) pro-
vides that a cause of action accrues when the breach of warranty
occurs, 37 which, in turn, is dependent upon the type of warranty
given. The breach occurs either when the goods are tendered for
delivery, or when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discov-
ered, the defect in the goods.38
Normally, a breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery
is made,39 even though the purchaser does not know the goods are
defective. 40 It is only where the seller gives a warranty which "ex-
plicitly extends to future performance," and where "discovery of
the breach must await the time of such performance," that the
breach occurs at the time the defect is, or should have been, dis-
covered.41 While it may seem that all warranties extend to future
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1978). See supra notes 11-12.
37. See supra note 11 for the text of § 2-725.
38. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978). See supra note 11 for the text of § 2-725.
39. Generally, "[t]ender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold con-
forming goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer any notification
reasonably necessary to enable him to take delivery." U.C.C. § 2-503 (1978)
(emphasis added). It has, however, been held that, "for the purposes of § 2-
725, tender of delivery refers to an offer of goods under a contract as if in
fulfillment of its conditions even though there is a defect when measured
against the contract obligation." Standard Alliance, Indus. v. Black Clawson
Co., 587 F.2d 813, 819 (6th Cir. 1978). To hold that tender of delivery does not
occur until the goods are proved nondefective would extend the statute of
limitations indefinitely into the future: "A defect at the time of delivery
would prevent 'due tender' from taking place until [the defect] was correct."
Id. It should also be noted that where installation of the goods is required,
tender of delivery occurs not when the goods are physically brought to the
site, but when the installation is complete. Id. at 819. See also Jandreau v.
Sheesley Plumbing & Heating Co., 324 N.W.2d 266, 270 (S.D. 1982).
40. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978). See supra note 11 for the text of § 2-725(2).
41. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978). See supra note 11 for the text of § 2-725(2).
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performance, the language of section 2-725(2) has been narrowly
construed and assigned a specific meaning by the courts.42 Not all
warranties explicitly extend to future performance of the goods.
In summary, before a court can determine whether a cause of
action is barred by the statute of limitations, it must first discern
the type of warranty given by the seller. It is the plaintiff who has
the burden of proving the warranty given by the seller.43 If the
plaintiff does not want his action to have accrued upon tender of
delivery, but rather upon discovery of the defect, he must prove
that the seller gave a warranty that explicitly extended to the fu-
ture performance of the product, and that any defects in the prod-
uct were not discoverable until such future performance had
occurred.44
B. The Existing Case Law
When does a warranty explicitly extend to future performance
of a product? The courts have consistently held that only an ex-
press warranty can explicitly extend to future performance. 4 5 The
"explicit" requirement of section 2-725(2) requires that the war-
ranty be express. An implied warranty "by its very nature cannot
'explicitly extend to future performance.'" 4 6 The term "explicit"
means that which is distinctly and clearly stated in plain language,
and not merely implied or conveyed by implication. 47 A pur-
chaser's mere expectation, no matter how reasonable, that the
product will last "a long time" is not enough to constitute a war-
ranty that explicitly extends to future performance.4 8
In addition, the language of the express warranty must be spe-
42. See infra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
43. Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (N.D. N.Y. 1977). See
generally Ferguson v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 524 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Conn. 1981);
Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371 (1976).
44. See generally Ferguson v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 524 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Conn.
1981); Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371 (1976).
45. See, e.g., Clark v. Dehavel Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1981);
Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-Am. Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D. Mo.
1971); Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Prods. Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d 411, 413, 343 N.E.2d
530, 532 (1976); Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 21 Ill. App. 3d 867, 871, 315
N.E.2d 580, 583-84 (1974); Grand Island School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb.
559, 568, 279 N.W.2d 603, 609 (1979).
46. Clark v. Dehavel Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1981). This
court cites numerous cases in support of this proposition.
47. Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-Am. Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D. Mo.
1971); Harney v. Spellman, 113 Ill. App. 2d 463, 465, 251 N.E.2d 265, 266 (1969).
48. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 94, 435 N.E.2d
443, 454 (1982); Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Prods. Co., 36 111. App. 3d 411, 413,
343 N.E.2d 530, 532 (1976); Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 21 Ill. App. 3d 867,
871, 315 N.E.2d 580, 583 (1974). But c.f. Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc.,
42 A.D. 2d 573, 574, 344 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (1973) (suggesting that a purchaser's
[Vol. 63:611
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cific and explicitly refer to a future time of performance. 49 A war-
ranty can be express without being explicit: "Even where a
warranty is express, courts are reluctant to infer from its language
terms of prospective operation or conditions which are not clearly
stated."5 0 Where nothing is said regarding how long the warranty
is to last, the statute of limitations begins to run upon tender of
delivery.5 1 The warranty must clearly state that the product will
perform properly and for a specified period of time. It is not
enough that the warranty states that the product "will perform," 52
is "designed to give long and reliable service,"5 3 or that the product
will perform in a certain manner under certain conditions.5 4 Like-
wise, it has been held that a warranty promising to replace or re-
pair the product for a period of time does not explicitly extend to
future performance.55 On the other hand, an express warranty
that explicitly guaranties the product for a lifetime,56 for a specific
term of years,57 or states that the product "will give satisfactory
service at all times," 58 will extend to future performance.
Prior to Moore, the Nebraska Supreme Court aligned itself with
the other jurisdictions that held that the "discovery" exception of
section 2-725(2) requires an express warranty that expressly and
explicitly refers to future performance. In Grand Island School
expectations should be effectuated where the very nature of the product im-
plies performance over an extended period of time).
49. E.g., Standard Alliance, Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813,820 (6th Cir.
1978); Ferguson v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 524 F. Supp. 1042, 1047 (D. Conn. 1981);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 IM. 2d 69, 93-94, 435 N.E.2d 443, 454
(1982).
50. Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Prods. Co., 36 ll. App. 3d 411, 413, 343 N.E.2d 530,
532 (1976).
51. E.g., Standard Alliance, Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820 (6th Cir.
1978).
52. Id. at 819-20.
53. Homart Dev. Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 63 App. Div. 2d 727, 727, 405 N.Y.S.2d
310, 310 (1978).
54. E.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 fll.2d 69,92-94, 435 N.E.2d 443,
453-54 (1982). But see Perry v. Augustine, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 416,418 (Ct. of Com.
P1. 1965) (representation as to expected performance of a furnace held to cre-
ate an express warranty extending to future performance).
55. E.g., Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 648, 545 P.2d 371, 378 (1976);
Grand Island School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 568, 279 N.W.2d 603,
609 (1979). But see Standard Alliance, Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d
813, 821 n.17 (6th Cir. 1978) (arguing that there is no conceputal distinction
between a warranty and a contractual "replace or repair" provision).
56. E.g., Rempe v. General Elec. Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 160, 163, 254 A.2d 577, 579
(1969). See generally J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, § 11-9, at 419.
57. E.g., Standard Alliance, Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813,821 (6th Cir.
1978); United States Indus., Inc. v. Mitchell, 148 Ga. App. 770, 770, 252 S.E.2d
672, 673 (1979).




District v. Celotex Corporation,59 the plaintiff brought an action al-
leging that a manufacturer of roofing materials breached its im-
plied warranty that the roofing system was fit for the purpose
intended. 60 The court recognized that unless the "discovery" ex-
ception of section 2-725(2) applied, i.e., unless the defendant gave a
warranty which explicitly extended to future performance, the
plaintiff's action would be barred by the statute of limitations. The
defendant had given a guaranty bond under which it promised to
repair leaks in the roof caused by ordinary wear and tear for a pe-
riod of twenty years. 61 In holding that the bond did not constitute
a warranty guarantying the future performance of the goods, the
court stated that the "discovery" exception to section 2-725(2) "ap-
plies only where the seller explicitly states ... that the product
will [for example] 'last for ten years.' "62
In addition to requiring that the express warranty explicitly re-
fer to future performance, section 2-725(2) also requires that dis-
covery of the defect must await future performance.6 3 The statute
must be read in the conjunctive: it requires that the warranty ex-
plicitly extend to future performance, and discovery of any defects
must await such performance.64
There is practically no case law construing the requirement
that discovery of the defect must await future performance. While
courts have been accused of overlooking this requirement,65 the
truth is that few courts have needed to address the requirement
because the warranty in question failed to be express or explicitly
refer to a future time.
At first glance, the requirement that discovery must await fu-
ture performance appears to add little, if anything, to section 2-
725(2). At what other time is the purchaser to discover defects but
after tender of delivery? Defects generally are not discovered until
the purchaser has the product in his possession. However, it is
possible that this requirement does not refer to the time the defect
is actually discovered, but rather the discoverability of the defect.
The statute requires that discovery of the defect must await future
performance. If the defect existed at the time of delivery and
could have been discovered prior to, or at that time, it fails to meet
59. 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603 (1979).
60. Id. at 567, 279 N.W.2d at 609.
61. Id. at 568, 279 N.W.2d at 609.
62. Id. at 568, 279 N.W.2d at 609 (emphasis in original).
63. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1978). See supra note 11. See also Voth v. Chrysler Motor
Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 648, 545 P.2d 371, 376 (1976).
64. See, e.g., Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 649, 545 P.2d 371, 376
(1976).
65. See Note, supra note 13, at 791.
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this prong of the "discovery" exception.66 While the Voth court did
not expressly characterize the defect, it seems obvious that it must
be considered patent. The "discovery" exception, however, seems
to require that the product be latently defective. 67
Succinctly, the "discovery" exception of section 2-725(2) has
been interpreted by the courts to require: 1) an express warranty;
2) language that specifically and explicitly refers to future time;
and 3) a defect that is not discoverable prior to, or at the time of,
delivery.68
C. The Warranty in Moore
The significance of the Moore decision lies in the recognition
that the Moores' remedy was limited to that provided by the Uni-
form Commercial Code. Because the Moores suffered only eco-
nomic loss,69 their cause of action lay exclusively under the
warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.7 0 If the
Moores' breach of warranty action was barred by the statute of
limitations, they would be left without recourse against the manu-
facturer. Therefore, it was essential that the Moores' cause of ac-
66. E.g., Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 649, 545 P.2d 371, 376 (1976).
67. This is the author's interpretation based on the language of the statute and a
general reading of Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371
(1976). See also Comment, The Sales Statute of Limitations in the Uniform
Commercial Code-Does it Preclude Prospective Implied Warranties?, 37
FonDHAm L. REV. 247, 249 (1968).
68. See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 9.
70. The U.C.C. governs the rights between the parties to a sales transaction that
results in solely an economic loss. See supra notes 4 & 10. The tort theories of
strict liability and negligence were not available to the plaintiffs because the
defective siding caused no physical harm to the plaintiffs or their property.
In the absence of physical harm to persons or property other than the prod-
uct itself, the purchaser of a product pursuant to contract cannot recover eco-
nomic losses from the manufacturer on claims based on negligent
manufacture or strict liability. See, e.g., National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steele
Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 786-87, 332 N.W.2d 39, 43-44 (1983). See also, Jones &
Laughlin Steel v. Johns-Manville Sales, 626 F.2d 280, 286-88 (3d Cir. 1980);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 85-88, 435 N.E.2d 443, 450-
52 (1982). However, some courts have allowed a purchaser to sue the manu-
facturer for solely economic loss, where the damage to the product itself oc-
curred as the result of a sudden, violent event, and not as a result of an
inherent defect that gradually reduced the product's value. See Star Furni-
ture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982). In addition,
the tort theory of misrepresentation was not available to the plaintiffs in
Moore because the defendant neither intentionally nor negligently made
false representations concerning the performance of the siding. See Moor-
man Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 88-89, 435 N.E.2d 443, 452-53
(1982).
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tion be timely commenced under the applicable statute of
limitations, i.e., section 2-725.
In order to hold that the Moores' suit was timely commenced,
the Nebraska Supreme Court had to cross an initial hurdle and
find that an express warranty had been given. The complaint al-
leged that the defendant impliedly warranted that the siding was
merchantable 7 ' and reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was
to be used72 by the Moores. 73 On appeal before the Nebraska
Supreme Court,74 the Moores argued that, "where a seller im-
pliedly warrants the future performance of a product, the statute
of limitations is extended until the breach is or should have been
discovered."75
In deeming it unnecessary to address the plaintiffs' implied
warranty argument,76 the court held that it was not bound to the
issue as framed by the parties.7 7 Though the plaintiffs pleaded and
argued their case on implied warranty theories, the court found
that the defendant had in fact given an express warranty78 in rep-
71. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). See supra note 20 for the text of § 2-314.
72. U.C.C. § 2-315 (1978). See supra note 21 for the text of § 2-315.
73. Transcript at 75 (Plaintiffs' Original Complaint), Moore v. Puget Sound Ply-
wood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983). The plaintiffs also fied an
amended complaint alleging that the defendant expressly warranted that the
siding would be merchantable and reasonably fit for the purpose for which it
was to be used. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. The defendant
specifically denied the existence of any express warranties. See supra notes
23-24 and accompanying text. Subsequently, the plaintiffs abandoned their
express warranty claim and proceeded to trial under the implied warranty
claim. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
74. The parties waived oral argument before the Nebraska Supreme Court and
had the court render a decision on the basis of the briefs submitted and the
record. See Report of Prehearing Conference Officer, Supreme Court of Ne-
braska, Dec. 10, 1982, Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332
N.W.2d 212 (1983).
75. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 16, 332 N.W.2d 212, 214
(1983).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 18, 332 N.W.2d at 215.
78. Express warranties are governed by U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978), which provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promises made by the seller to
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the ba-
sis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promises.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods
shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty
that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee"
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resenting the product as "siding."79 The description of the product
as "siding" became a part of the basis of the bargain and created
an express warranty.80
There is no question that an express warranty under section 2-
31381 was given in the description of the goods as "siding." How-
ever, it is questionable whether the court should have relied on the
express warranty in rendering its opinion. The existence of an ex-
press warranty may not have been sufficiently pleaded by the
plaintiffs. If this was the case, the defendant was mislead in pre-
paring its defense, and was prejudiced by the court's reliance on
the express warranty in making its decision.
It is true, as the court stated, that under Nebraska's code plead-
ing "it is the facts well pleaded, not the theory of recovery or the
legal conclusions, which state a cause of action."8 2 But it is equally
evident that the "court must assume the facts as alleged and can-
not assume the existence of any facts not alleged, nor facts in aid
of the pleading. . . ."83 In addition, the pleadings must advise the
adversary as to what he is called upon to contest,8 4 and the adver-
sary has a right to insist that all facts essential to a cause of action
be stated in the complaint.8 5 In Moore, the Nebraska court held
that the facts, as pleaded, put the defendant on notice that it may
be called upon to meet an express warranty claim; the defendant
was in no way mislead by the plaintiff's use of the word "im-
plied."8 6 The court's conclusion seems to ignore the fact that there
is a substantial difference between the creation of an implied war-
ranty and the creation of an express warranty.
An implied warranty of merchantability under section 2-31487
or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an
affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement pur-
porting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the
goods does not create a warranty.
79. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 17, 332 N.W.2d 212, 214-15
(1983).
80. Id. at 17, 332 N.W.2d at 215.
81. U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (b) (1978). See supra note 78 for the text of § 2-313(1) (b).
82. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 18, 332 N.W.2d 212, 215
(1983). See also Blaha GMC-Jeep, Inc. v. Frerichs, 211 Neb. 103, 111, 317
N.W.2d 894, 899 (1982); Newman Grove Creamery Co. v. Deaver, 208 Neb. 178,
182, 302 N.W.2d 697, 700 (1981); Remington v. Bryan, 205 Neb. 372, 380, 288
N.W.2d 253, 258 (1980).
83. Clark & Enerson, Hamersky, Schlaebitz, Burroughs & Thomsen, Inc. v. Schim-
mel Hotels Corp., 194 Neb. 810, 812, 235 N.W.2d 870, 872 (1975).
84. See, e.g., Lee v. Brodbeck, 196 Neb. 393, 398, 243 N.W.2d 331, 334 (1976); Pinker-
ton v. Leonhardt, 184 Neb. 430, 431, 168 N.W.2d 272, 273 (1969).
85. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Leonhardt, 184 Neb. 430, 431, 168 N.W.2d 272, 273 (1969).
86. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 18, 332 N.W.2d 212, 215
(1983).
87. See supra note 20 for the text of § 2-314.
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arises in all sales of goods where the seller is a merchant with re-
spect to goods of that kind.88 The warranty arises merely from the
seller's status as a merchant, independent of any representations,
conduct, samples, or models.89 With respect to pleading, the plain-
tiff need only plead that there was a sale of goods, the seller was a
merchant, and the goods were unmerchantable. Under section 2-
315,90 an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises
where the seller has reason to know the particular purpose for
which the goods are being bought and the purchaser is relying on
the seller's judgment to furnish suitable goods.9 1 Succinctly, im-
plied warranties reflect the reasonable expectations of the pur-
chaser and are not necessarily based on an affirmative act of the
seller.9 2 An implied warranty arises by implication and can exist
in the absence of an express warranty.
In contrast, the creation of an express warranty is dependent
upon some affirmative act which becomes the basis of the bar-
gain.93 An express warranty is created either by an affirmation of
fact or promise by the seller to the buyer, or by a description, sam-
ple, or model of the goods provided by either party.94 It is not
enough that the seller is a merchant or that the seller knows the
purpose for which the product will be used by the purchaser. Con-
sequently, facts alleging the breach of implied warranties may not
actually give one notice of the creation and breach of an express
warranty.
In Moore, the defendant may have been further mislead by the
fact that the plaintiffs argued solely implied warranties in the trial
court.9 5 Furthermore, the report of the prehearing conference of-
ficer, filed prior to the supreme court arguments, stated that there
was no evidence of an express warranty.96 In light of the possible
prejudicial effect to the defendant, it is questionable whether the
Moore court should have relied upon the express warranty in ren-
dering its decision.
However, the fact that an express warranty was given in
88. See supra note 20 for the text of § 2-314. See also U.C.C. § 2-314 comments 2-4
(1978).
89. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 1 (1978). See also U.C.C. § 2-314 comments 2-4 (1978).
90. See supra note 21 for the text of § 2-315.
91. U.C.C. § 2-315, comment 1 (1978).
92. See Note, supra note 9, at 923.
93. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978). See supra note 78 for the text of § 2-313.
94. U.C.C. § 2-313 (1978). See supra note 78 for the text of § 2-313.
95. Transcript at 10 (Plaintiffs' Trial Brief), Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc.,
214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983).
96. Report of Prehearing Conference Officer, Supreme Court of Nebraska, Dec.
10, 1982, Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212
(1983).
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Moore-that the goods were described as "siding"-does not alone
trigger the "discovery" exception of section 2-725(2).97 In light of
the Nebraska Supreme Court's Grand Island School District deci-
sion,98 and accepting as authority the case law of other jurisdic-
tions, a court must look to the language of the warranty and
determine whether it explicitly refers to a future time of perform-
ance.99 In Moore, the language consisted of the single word "sid-
ing." As to whether there was a reference to performance at a
future date, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the parties
stipulated at trial that "siding... is supposed to... last the life of
the house."100 Therefore, "the description of the goods as 'siding'
carried with it the representation that it would last the lifetime of
the house."'01 That is, at the time of sale, there was "created in the
minds of the parties the expectation that the siding would last the
lifetime of the house."'10 2 As a result, the warranty "necessarily ex-
tended explicitly to future performance." 0 3
In Moore, the Nebraska Supreme Court did what other courts
have refused to do-allow the buyers' expectations to trigger the
"discovery" exception of section 2-725(2) in the absence of clear,
distinct, and explicit terms referring to the future performance of
the product.104 The parties' stipulation adds little support to the
court's reasoning. It is unclear as to what the parties stipulated. In
their trial brief, the plaintiffs stated the stipulation to be that "the
buyer of exterior siding expected it to last the lifetime of the
house."' 05 This is nothing more than a stipulation to expectations;
it is not the same as saying the siding would in fact last a lifetime.
The mere expectation, however reasonable, that, due to the nature
of the product, it will last a long time, is not sufficient to make the
statute of limitations commence upon the discovery of the defect
rather than at tender of delivery. 0 6
The Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted the stipulation to im-
ply that the "siding... [was] supposed to last the lifetime of the
97. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
98. Grand Island School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603
(1979). See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
99. See Grand Island School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 568, 279 N.W.2d
603, 609 (1979).
100. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 16, 332 N.W.2d 212, 214
(1983).
101. Id. at 17, 332 N.W.2d at 214-15.
102. Id. at 17, 332 N.W.2d at 215 (emphasis added).
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 45-64 and accompanying text.
105. Transcript at 11 (Plaintiffs' Trial Brief), Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc.,
214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983).
106. Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Prods. Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d 411, 413, 343 N.E.2d 530,
532 (1976). See also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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house."'107 Even under this interpretation, it is questionable
whether the language distinctly and explicitly refers to future per-
formance. Is "supposed to" the equivalent of a guaranty that the
siding will in fact "last a lifetime"?10 8 In any event, no explicit
terms were ever articulated or clearly communicated at the time of
sale. The nature and extent of the warranty was not explicitly
stated. Rather, it existed by implication in the mind of the pur-
chaser. In effect, the court read the "explicit" requirement out of
section 2-725(2). Satisfied with its finding of an express warranty
that explicitly extended to future performance, the Moore court
never addressed the issue of whether discovery of the defect had
to await such future performance.
In light of its prior decision in Grand Island School District, and
the case law of other jurisdictions, the Nebraska Supreme Court's
decision in Moore is an aberration. It is possible to fault the Moore
court for its anomalous decision. At the same time, it should be
recognized that Moore is a case in which a court tried to escape the
effect of a poorly drafted statute that ignores reality and is con-
trary to an underlying policy of contract law and the U.C.C.109 Nev-
ertheless, the arguments which may be advanced in support of
Moore all fall short in justifying the court's decision.
It is well established in contract law that a major objective of
contractual remedies is to protect a party's reasonable expecta-
tions." 0 Arguably, the construction and application of section 2-
725 does not serve this objective."' As applied to goods that nor-
mally have a useful life much greater than four years, for example,
siding, bricks, roofing materials, and large pieces of equipment,
section 2-725 is unjust and ignores reality." 2
For example, a farmer might purchase a new milking machine,
which is normally expected to have a useful life of fifteen years.11 3
107. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 16, 332 N.W.2d 212, 214 (1983)
(emphasis added).
108. See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of how § 2-725 ignores reality and is contrary to the underly-
ing policy of the U.C.C., see Note, supra note 13, at 787-90.
110. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 812-14 (1982). See generally J. WHTE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at §§ 10-1 to -3 (1980).
111. See Note, supra note 13, at 787-90.
112. Id.
113. Assume that during the course of dealings the seller gave no express warran-
ties, but the sales contract which the farmer received upon purchase de-
scribed the equipment as a new "Acme Milking Machine." Although the
contract is silent as to the future performance of the machine, the farmer
knows from the experience of other farmers that Acme Milking Machines are
generally good for at least fifteen years. Furthermore, while the description
of the product as an "Acme Milking Machine" does not explicitly refer to the
future performance of the machine, it does establish the standard against
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The seller gives no express warranties, but because of his status as
a merchant, an implied warranty of merchantability attaches to the
milking machine.114 Six years after the date of delivery, a latent
defect renders the machine totally useless. The farmer's reason-
able expectation was that the machine would be fit for its ordinary
purpose and that it would perform satisfactorily for fifteen years.
However, because the seller did not give an express warranty ex-
plicitly extending to future performance, the statute of limitations
expired four years after the date of delivery and two years before
the defect became apparent. If the farmer's remedy lay solely
under the U.C.C., he is left without any recourse against the seller,
despite the machine's unusually short lIffe.115
However, the fact that section 2-725 may seem unjust in light of
a purchaser's reasonable expectations as to the normal useful life
of the product does not authorize a court to ignore the statute's
plain language, nor excuse the court from failing to give the statute
effect. Courts cannot refuse to give a statute of limitation effect
merely because it operates harshly in a case involving a meritori-
ous claim."16
In enacting statutes of limitations, legislatures have attempted
to balance the interests of the purchaser with the interests of the
manufacturer. Manufacturers have an interest in being protected
from stale claims."l7 It would be unfair to a manufacturer to allow
a party to bring a claim after a certain period of time has passed
and the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time.1l8 Man-
ufacturers also have an interest in being protected from infinite
and endless litigation."19 After a particular product has been sold
and is in the possession of the purchaser for a period of time, the
manufacturer should no longer have to be concerned about claims
being filed with respect to the product. In order to protect manu-
facturers from infinite litigation and to prevent unreasonable delay
in the filing of claims, legislatures enacted statutes of limitations
fixing a reasonable time in which claims must be fled.120
which the merchantability of the machine will be determined. See U.C.C. § 2-
314(1) (1978).
114. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). See supra note 20 for text of § 2-314. See also U.C.C. § 2-
314 comments 2-3 (1980).
115. Where a purchaser's loss is solely economic and no express warranty is given
with respect to the product, the purchaser can only hope that, if the product
is defective, the defect will make itself apparent within four years from the
date of delivery. See supra notes 9 & 10 and accompanying text.
116. 51 Am. JuR. 2v Limitation of Action § 19 (1970).
117. Id. at § 17.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at §§ 17-19.
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The drafters of the Code considered four years to be a reason-
able time in which to file an action for breach of warranty.'21 Even
though the four-year limitation period may be arbitrary and based
on convenience rather than logic,' 2 2 manufacturers have a right to
rely on the expectation that the statute will be enforced. Giving
effect to a purchaser's reasonable expectations with respect to the
useful life of a product thwarts the policies underlying the statute
of limitations. A statute of limitations dependent upon a pur-
chaser's reasonable expectations would result in a different period
of limitation for each and every product sold.123 Consequently,
manufacturers would be forever liable for a breach of warranty on
any goods they sold.
A second argument that could be advanced in support of Moore
is that the courts have consistently misread the term "explicit" in
the statute.124 Section 2-725(2) states, inter alia, that a breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, "except ...
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance
.... "125 Courts have construed this phrase as requiring an ex-
press warranty.126 However, the term "explicitly" is used as an
adverb modifying "extends to future performance," not as an ad-
jective modifying "warranty." The "discovery" exception does not
mandate an "explicit" warranty. Rather, it requires the warranty,
be it expressed or implied, to be explicitly directed toward future
performance. 2 7
However, this argument only renders the need for an express
warranty unnecessary; the court need not find that the seller gave
an express warranty. It does not change the requirement that the
warranty explicitly extend to future performance. Even an im-
plied warranty must explicitly refer to a future time of perform-
ance. A description of the goods as a "new Acme Milking
Machine" or "siding," whether the description be express or in the
121. See, e.g., Standard Alliance, Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820 (6th
Cir. 1978). Even though the drafters of the Code considered four years to be a
reasonable period of time, states, when adopting the U.C.C., were free to in-
crease the period of limitations. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-725 (West
1963) (increases the U.C.C. period of limitation to five years); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 402.725 (West 1964) (U.C.C. period of limitation is six years).
122. Generally, the period of limitation determined by the legislature is arbitrary
and based on the need to have a point in which where the seller can be cer-
tain that claims arising from products sold in the past will no longer be filed.
See 51 Am. JuR. 2D, supra note 116.
123. See Standard Alliance, Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820 (6th Cir.
1978).
124. See Note, supra note 13, at 791.
125. U.C.C. § 2-725 (1978). See supra note 11 for the text of § 2-725.
126. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 11. See also Note, supra note 13, at 791.
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contract of sale,128 merely states what the product is and the stan-
dard against which merchantability is to be determined. 2 9 The
"explicit" requirement of section 2-725(2) requires more than just
a description of what the product is; it requires a specific and ex-
plicit reference to future performance. Under section 2-725(2), a
seller cannot warrant that a product will last "twenty years" or "a
lifetime" without explicitly doing so in the sales contract or in the
course of dealing. Expectations of the product's future perform-
ance that arise from circumstances outside the contract descrip-
tion or the course of dealing, that is, from the purchaser's
knowledge of other milking machines or siding products, do not
satisfy the explicit requirement of section 2-725(2). While the
goods in Moore may have been described as "siding," the purchas-
ers' expectations as to future performance arose from circum-
stances outside of the contract or the course of dealing with the
seller. Consequently, the "explicit" requirement of section 2-725
remained unsatisfied.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS
In states other than Nebraska, one can argue that Moore is an
anomalous result that establishes no precedent and deserves little,
if any, attention. But, in spite of the fact that the tenuous analysis
of Moore may be out-of-sync with the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions, Moore is authority in Nebraska. However, the precedent
Moore established in Nebraska is uncertain. The decision reached
in Moore falls short of the court's requirement in Grand Island
School District that the warranty be express and that its language
specifically and explicitly refer to a future time of performance.
Arguably, the Nebraska Supreme Court has in effect redefined the
requirements of the "discovery" exception of section 2-725(2) so as
to not require an explicit reference to future time of performance.
Under Moore, a stipulation subsequent to the time of sale that the
purchaser expected the goods to last a period of time satisfies the
"explicit" requirement of the "discovery" exception. Conse-
quently, in future breach of warranty cases, defense counsel
should not stipulate as to the extent of the warranty or the pur-
chaser's expectations. In addition, defense counsel should always
read between the lines of the complaint, irrespective of the labels
128. A description of the goods in the sales contract states what the goods are and
impliedly warrants that the goods will perform as described, i.e., as a "New
Acme Milking Machine." That is, the description establishes the standard for
merchantability. However, this is different than the "explicit" requirement of
§ 2-725, where the seller must explicitly refer to the future performance of the
product.
129. See supra notes 20 & 128 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff places on his cause of action and allegations. Even if
the plaintiff pleads only implied warranty theories, the defendant
should make full discovery and be prepared to meet an express
warranty analysis by the court.
V. CONCLUSION
While Moore may be seen as a victory in the field of consumer
protection, it may be of questionable value because of the court's
tenuous analysis in fitting the facts under the language of section
2-725(2). Moore can be viewed as a court's attempt to escape the
harsh effect that a statute of limitations has on what may be a mer-
itorious claim. The problem in Moore was not the law itself, but
the application of the law to the specific facts presented. The court
recognized the well established requirements that the warranty be
express and that the warranty explicitly refer to future time of per-
formance.13 0 However, since the facts of the plaintiffs' case did not
readily fall within the "discovery" exception, the court had to ac-
tively massage the facts if it was to hold the complaint timely filed
and not barred by the statute of limitations. In doing so, the court
departed from other jurisdictions and its own decision in Grand
Island School District, giving effect to the purchaser's reasonable
expectations with respect to the nature of the product. Whether
this departure was intentional or inadvertent, the court essentially
ignored the "explicit" requirement of the statute. On the one
hand, Moore may be viewed as an aberration; on the other, it may
be viewed as a judicial forerunner of what is to come.
William J. Schrank '84
130. It is clear from the court's analysis that it knew there must be an express
warranty given, and that it explicitly refer to future preformance. Otherwise,
the court's analysis would not have followed the step-by-step progression it
did. See Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 16-17, 332 N.W.2d
212, 214-15 (1983). The court also was aware of these requirements in its prior
decision in Grand Island School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 568, 279
N.W.2d 603, 609 (1979).
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